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DOCS V. GLOCKS: SPEECH, GUNS, DISCRIMINATION, AND
PRIVACYIS ANYONE WINNING?
Marla Spector Bowman*
Abstract
Americans discuss some of the most intimate details of their lives
within the small confines of their neighborhood doctor’s office. Many
Americans, however, may be taken aback if their physician asked them
whether they owned a firearm during a routine physical examination.
Although most Americans might not consider firearms education to be
their physician’s primary purpose, a significant number of doctors in
Florida, and throughout the medical community, consider promoting
firearms safety a part of practicing preventative medicine.
When a group of Florida legislators saw this behavior as a threat to
the Second Amendment, gun owner access to healthcare, and patient
privacy, they took action and passed the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act
(FOPA). FOPA effectively prohibits doctors from asking patients about
gun ownership, recording patient gun ownership information, or
discriminating against patients who own guns. When physicians
challenged FOPA as a violation of the First Amendment, the “Docs v.
Glocks” controversy was born. At first, a federal district court ruled for
the doctors and enjoined FOPA’s enforcement on First Amendment
grounds. But then, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reversed this ruling (twice).
While the Eleventh Circuit’s second opinion still leaves plenty of
room for dismay over the manner in which physicians’ freedom of
expression has been limited, instead of focusing on the First Amendment,
this Note seeks to focus on what FOPA’s enforcement means for Florida
and the rest of the country. Focusing on the antidiscrimination and
privacy concerns that motivated the passage of FOPA, this Note
concludes that the law accomplishes very little. This is because there is
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no substantial evidence that gun owner discrimination is preventing gun
owners from accessing healthcare. Further, if such discrimination did
exist, it would be extremely difficult to prove even with the help of laws
like FOPA. In addition, gun owner information that may be stored in a
physician’s computer is no safer under FOPA than it was under the
privacy laws that already protect medical information recorded by
physicians.
Both sides in this controversy—doctors and gun owners—are misled
in their opinion of the harm or benefit created by FOPA. The resources
and energy spent arguing over NRA-propagated gun owner
discrimination claims and the value of gun ownership information that is
privately stored in a physician’s computer could be better spent on other
issues such as preventing mentally ill individuals from accessing
firearms.
After providing a history of FOPA and discussing its failings from a
discrimination and privacy standpoint, this Note will highlight some of
the progress being made with regard to firearms legislation in hopes that
it will encourage such productive activity that helps promote public safety
while simultaneously protecting the constitutional right to bear arms. Gun
ownership and gun safety do not have to be at odds with each other; they
are actually quite compatible.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 2, 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed the Firearm
Owners’ Privacy Act (FOPA) into law.1 The law effectively prohibits
doctors from asking patients whether they own a gun.2 The Florida
Legislature set out to create a law that would prevent doctors from
discriminating against gun owners3 while protecting the privacy interests
of gun-owning patients.4 The legislature, however, only succeeded at
chilling the speech of physicians while not actually preventing physicians
from refusing to treat patients who own guns.5
This chilling effect inevitably led physicians to challenge FOPA as a
violation of the First Amendment. The media has cleverly titled this
litigation “Docs v. Glocks,”6 but the litigation really pits the First
Amendment against the Second Amendment. Because the U.S. Supreme
Court has yet to clarify the level of scrutiny that should be applied to laws
that restrict professional speech,7 this has allowed for vastly different
interpretations of FOPA under the guise of First Amendment
jurisprudence.8 While this strongly suggests that the Supreme Court
should help clarify this area of the law so that the speech rights of
professionals will be less malleable within the hands of the lower courts,
this Note intends to address what the enforcement of FOPA means for
physicians in the meantime.
1. STATE OF FLA. HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, H.B. 2011-155, at
2 [hereinafter FINAL BILL ANALYSIS]; Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), No.
12–14009, 2015 WL 453045, at *2 (11th Cir. July 28, 2015); see also Emily Miller, MILLER:
“Docs v. Glocks” Showdown in Florida, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/5/docs-vs-glocks-showdown-in-florida/.
2. FLA. STAT. § 790.388 (2014).
3. Id. § 790.388(5) (“A health care practitioner . . . may not discriminate against a patient
based solely upon the patient’s exercise of the constitutional right to own and possess firearms or
ammunition.” (emphasis added)).
4. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045 at *1. According to FOPA’s sponsor,
Representative Jason Brodeur, patients are worried that with the passage of the Affordable Care
Act “Washington, D.C., is going to know whether or not they own a gun and so [the law] is really
just a privacy protection.” Aaron Sharockman, Florida Lawmaker Suggests Doctors Can Use Gun
Information Against You, POLITIFACT FLA. (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2011
/feb/01/jason-brodeur/florida-lawmaker-suggests-doctors-can-use-gun-info/ (internal quotation marks
omitted).
5. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
(“[T]he law does not prevent a physician from terminating the doctor-patient relationship if a
patient refuses to answer questions regarding firearm ownership” and thus “[t]he
antidiscrimination provision therefore provides only remote, if any, support for the State’s
asserted purpose.”).
6. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 1.
7. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045 at *20–21.
8. See infra Sections I.C–I.D.
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Many doctors—pediatricians and mental health professionals in
particular—find firearm ownership to be a relevant factor in providing
preventative medical care.9 If a doctor knows that a patient or a parent of
a minor patient owns a gun, then the doctor can provide proper instruction
on how to safely store the weapon to avoid injuries, especially to children.
It is not uncommon for doctors practicing preventative medicine to ask
patients a variety of health and safety questions about the presence of
chemicals, swimming pools, drugs, tobacco, alcohol, and guns in the
home.10 In addition, gun ownership may be especially relevant to a
physician if a patient suffers from mental illness.11
The state’s desire to eliminate gun-related conversations between
doctors and their patients directly contradicts two other Florida statutes
that support just the opposite. Florida has two relevant laws that seem to
promote the proactive steps doctors were taking to encourage firearm
safety before the passage of FOPA. First, Florida Statute § 790.25
encourages firearm safety and prevents firearms from getting into the
hands of mentally incompetent individuals.12 Second, Florida Statute
§ 790.174(1) provides that a person who reasonably knows a minor may
gain access to a firearm “shall keep the firearm in a securely locked box
or container or in a location which a reasonable person would believe to
be secure.”13 Further, Florida Statute § 790.174(2) states that a violation
of § 790.174(1) is a second-degree misdemeanor.14
9. See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger II), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1268 (S.D. Fla.
2012), rev’d sub nom. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045; First Amended Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Wollschlaeger v. Scott, at 14–15, 18–21 (No. 11-CV-22026),
2011 WL 4074922 (S.D. Fla. June 24, 2011) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint].
10. First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 32.
11. Id. at 15 (“Consultations regarding firearm safety are also a routine part of adult medical
care, help adult patients minimize heath [sic] hazards, and are particularly important in the context
of treating mental health conditions.”). Yet just because a doctor has recorded a patient’s gun
ownership information, this does not mean it can be used to protect the health and safety of the
patient, her family and friends, or the community. See infra Part III (discussing FOPA, mental
health, and medical privacy laws).
12. Florida Statute § 790.25 states that “[t]he Legislature finds as a matter of public
policy . . . that it is necessary to promote firearms safety and to curb and prevent the use of
firearms . . . by incompetent persons” and then lists “[a] person who has been adjudged mentally
incompetent” as an individual unauthorized to carry a firearm.
13. FLA. STAT. § 790.174(1) (2014).
14. Id. § 790.174(2) (“It is a misdemeanor of the second degree . . . if a person violates
[790.174](1) by failing to store or leave a firearm in the required manner and as a result thereof a
minor gains access to the firearm, without the lawful permission of the minor’s parent or the
person having charge of the minor, and possesses or exhibits it, without the supervision required
by law.”). In addition, the legislature has found that:
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It certainly seems that doctors who ask patients about firearm
ownership are attempting to promote the goals of Florida Statutes
§§ 790.25 and 790.174 by advising patients on safely storing firearms and
keeping them away from minors and individuals suffering from mental
illness. At the same time, many patients may certainly wonder what
qualifies a medical doctor as an appropriate person to give advice on
firearm safety. While this Note will not delve into that question further,
it will explore the affect of FOPA and what its enforcement means for
physicians and patients.
This Note will focus on whether FOPA truly serves as a means of both
preventing gun owner discrimination and protecting the privacy and
Second Amendment interests of gun-owning patients. While some
scholars have discussed “Docs v. Glocks” from a First Amendment
perspective,15 none have actually looked at a doctor’s right to
discriminate against a gun owner or the actual value of a patient’s gun
ownership information in the hands of a physician. Among other things,
this Note attempts to fill that void and predict how this issue may play
out on a national stage as other states adopt similar legislation.
As firearms become an increasingly polarizing issue in the United
States, the question of whether gun owners need protection from
discrimination becomes increasingly relevant. In addition, as mental
health and gun ownership become increasingly intertwined,16 it is
a tragically large number of Florida children have been accidentally killed or
seriously injured by negligently stored firearms; that placing firearms within the
reach or easy access of children is irresponsible, encourages such accidents, and
should be prohibited; and that legislative action is necessary to protect the safety
of our children.
Id. § 790.173(1).
15. See, e.g., Gayland O. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs: Legislative Restrictions on PatientPhysician Speech About Firearms, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1 (2011); Michelle Foody,
Note, Docs Versus Glocks: N.R.A Takes Aim at Florida Physician’s Freedom of Speech: Leaving
Patients’ Health, Safety, and Welfare at Risk, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 228; Erika
Manderscheid, Comment, Return Fire: An En Banc Hearing in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of
Florida Is Necessary to Protect the First Amendment Rights of Physicians, 56 B.C. L. REV. E.
SUPP. 123 (2015); Recent Cases, First Amendment—Eleventh Circuit Upholds Florida Law
Banning Doctors from Inquiring About Patients’ Gun Ownership When Such Inquiry Is Irrelevant
to Medical Care.—Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014), 128
HARV. L. REV. 1045 (2015).
16. Mass shootings by individuals suffering from mental illness are nothing new, but they
are gaining increased national attention and are perhaps becoming more frequent. In the Sandy
Hook massacre, Adam Lanza—suffering from mental illness—shot and killed his mother, twenty
first-graders, and six women. Alison Leigh Cowan, Adam Lanza’s Mental Problems ‘Completely
Untreated’ Before Newtown Shootings, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/nyregion/before-newtown-shootings-adam-lanzas-mentalproblems-completely-untreated-report-says.html. The prevalence of mental illness among those
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important to clarify a doctor’s role in managing a patient’s health as it
relates to gun ownership.
In summary, this Note attempts to answer two pressing questions: (1)
whether physicians can discriminate against gun owners; and (2) whether
the collection of gun ownership information from patients actually helps
physicians promote public safety despite privacy concerns related to the
collection of this information. This Note then shifts its focus to highlight
legislation that works in tandem to promote the interests of gun owners
and gun safety advocates in hopes that this will encourage further
cooperation between those on both sides of this increasingly divisive
issue.
Part I of this Note will discuss the history and expansion of the “Docs
v. Glocks” controversy from FOPA’s passage in the Florida Legislature
to its challenge in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida and eventual appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. Part II will delve into whether doctors can discriminate against
patients for exercising their right to bear arms. Part III will discuss
privacy issues and legislation that controls how a doctor may utilize
recorded patient gun ownership information. This Note will conclude by
drawing attention to the real issues relating to guns and mental health that
FOPA and the surrounding “Docs v. Glocks” controversy failed to
address or remedy in light of other small improvements in this area.
I. FOPA AND ITS PROGENY
When Amber Ullman took her infant daughter to the pediatrician, she
likely never thought her doctor would ask whether she owned a firearm;
who carry out mass shootings remains a pressing national issue deserving of concerted attention.
On September 16, 2013, Aaron Alexis, who was experiencing delusions that he was being
controlled by low-frequency electromagnetic waves, shot and killed twelve individuals and
wounded four others at the Washington Navy Yard. Greg Bothelo & Joe Sterling, FBI: Navy Yard
Shooter “Delusional,” Said “Low Frequency Attacks” Drive Him to Kill, CNN (Sept. 26, 2013,
12:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/25/us/washington-navy-yard-investigation. In Aurora,
Colorado, James Holmes, a psychiatric patient at the University of Colorado, shot and killed
twelve people and injured fifty-eight in a movie theater. CNN Wire Staff, Colorado Movie
Shooting Suspect Charged with Murder, CNN (July 31, 2012, 11:30 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/30/us/colorado-theater-shooting/. It is also hard to forget Jared
Loughner, who shot nineteen individuals including Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords on
January 8, 2011 while Loughner was suffering from schizophrenia. Dennis Wagner, Records
Detail Shooter’s Agitation Before Ariz. Rampage, USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2013, 10:47 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/27/gabby-giffords-shooting-records/2024589/.
This all certainly begs the question: How can we stop this? Does the collection of gun ownership
information from patients enable doctors to step in to prevent these tragedies? See infra Part III
(discussing the privacy of medical records and the limited exceptions for doctors to reveal
confidential patient information). What interests are superior—the privacy interests of gun
owners, or those concerned with public safety?
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nor did she think this incident would lead to reactionary legislation in the
form of FOPA. Yet, both of these things happened, and eventually, this
innocuous doctor’s visit led to four conflicting federal court opinions that
highlight the unsettled nature of professional speech restrictions under
the First Amendment. This Part details the progression of FOPA from its
passage by the Florida Legislature to the Eleventh Circuit’s reversal of
the district court’s enjoinment of the statute. As this Note explains below,
FOPA and its subsequent litigation was fueled more by politics than
purpose, and could have easily been avoided in favor of more pressing
public concerns regarding firearms safety.
A. The Ocala Story
The motivation for FOPA derived from an incident at a pediatrician’s
office in Ocala, Florida in 2010.17 When Amber Ullman brought her fourmonth-old daughter to the pediatrician for an examination, she probably
never expected Dr. Chris Okonkwo to inquire about whether she kept a
gun in her home.18 After Ullman refused to answer the question, Dr.
Okonkwo finished the examination and informed Ullman that she had
thirty days to find a new pediatrician.19 Ullman felt the doctor’s question
was invasive and personal, but Dr. Okonkwo claimed the question was
asked to determine the need to advise parents about gun safety in a home
with children.20 He equated this to asking parents whether they have a
pool in their home to decide whether to advise them about water safety
for their children.21 Despite the fact that Dr. Okonkwo had been asking
these firearms related questions for two to three years,22 the incident with
Ullman developed into a firestorm of controversy that ultimately led to
the passage of FOPA.
Dr. Okonkwo said that Ullman’s status as a gun owner did not drive
his decision to cease treating Ullman’s daughter but rather that her failure
to answer his question demonstrated that they could not develop a
relationship of trust essential to dealing with important health issues in
the future.23 The Florida Legislature, however, viewed this incident as a
physician discriminating against a gun owner; a matter that needed to be
addressed with legislation.24
17. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 2.
18. Fred Hiers, Family and Pediatrician Tangle over Gun Question, OCALA.COM (July 24,
2010, 11:52 AM), http://www.ocala.com/article/20100724/ARTICLES/7241001.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 2.
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B. Legislative Action
In response to the Ocala incident, Florida Representative Jason
Brodeur filed House Bill 155, which would eventually become the
Firearms Owners’ Privacy Act.25 According to Brodeur, “the purpose of
the bill [was] to protect families from being denied treatment for refusing
to answer questions about guns in their home.”26 The relevant portions of
FOPA read as follows:
(1) A health care practitioner . . . may not intentionally enter
any disclosed information concerning firearm ownership
into the patient’s medical record if the practitioner knows
that such information is not relevant to the patient’s medical
care or safety, or the safety of others.
(2) A health care practitioner . . . shall respect a patient’s
right to privacy and should refrain from making a written
inquiry or asking questions concerning the ownership of a
firearm . . . . Notwithstanding this provision, a health care
practitioner or health care facility that in good faith believes
that this information is relevant to the patient’s medical care
or safety, or the safety of others, may make such a verbal or
written inquiry. . . .
....
(5) A health care practitioner . . . may not discriminate
against a patient based solely upon the patient’s exercise of
the constitutional right to own and possess firearms or
ammunition.27
Before passing FOPA, the Florida Legislature recognized that
professional medical groups—including the American Medical
Association (AMA)—“encourage[ their] members to inquire as to the
presence of household firearms as a part of childproofing the home and
to educate patients to the dangers of firearms to children.”28 Despite this
encouragement, under FOPA, physicians may be fined up to $10,000 or
have their medical license suspended or revoked for asking firearms

25. Id. at 1.
26. Katie Moisse, A Crime for Doctors to Ask About Guns?, ABC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/w_ParentingResource/pediatricians-parents-guns-home/story?id=
12770294.
27. FLA. STAT. § 790.388 (2014)
28. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 2; see also Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla.
(Wollschlaeger IV), No. 12–14009, 2015 WL 453045, at *29 (11th Cir. July 28, 2015) (Wilson,
J., dissenting) (discussing the AMA’s stance on this issue).
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related questions.29 The Florida Legislature also acknowledged that
“Florida’s statutes do not currently contain any provisions that dictate
when physicians and patients can terminate a doctor-patient
relationship.”30 Thus, while FOPA can attempt to prevent physicians
from asking patients whether they own a gun, physicians still have full
discretion to terminate doctor-patient relationships as long as they give
patients notice and a reasonable opportunity to find a new physician.31
Consequently, it may be difficult for gun owners to prove that a doctor
possessed the discriminatory intent prohibited by Florida Statute
§ 790.388(5) when terminating the patient relationship.32 Thus,
§ 790.388(5) really only prevents physicians from providing gun owners
with subpar care as compared to non-gun-owning patients, a violation
that may be equally difficult to prove.
Furthermore, the Florida House of Representatives Criminal Justice
Subcommittee acknowledged that FOPA “may be subject to challenge as
violating one’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech” and that
“[a] regulation that abridges speech because of the content of the speech
is subject to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review.”33 Even with
these concerns about FOPA’s potential infringement on the First
Amendment rights of physicians, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed
FOPA into law on June 2, 2011.34 Days later, physicians and physician’s
interest groups filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Florida challenging FOPA as a violation of the First
and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking to enjoin FOPA’s
enforcement.35

29. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 3. These looming consequences inevitably have
a chilling effect on physician speech. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, ¶¶ 71–
88, at 22–34. Under Brodeur’s original authorship, a physician could be fined up to $5 million for
a violation of FOPA. H.B. 155, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (original filed version, Jan. 10,
2011).
30. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 4.
31. Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 790.338(4) (2014) (“A patient’s decision not to answer a question
relating to the presence or ownership of a firearm does not alter existing law regarding a
physician’s authorization to choose his or her patients.”). But see id. § 395.1041 (requiring
physicians to provide all patients with medical treatment in an emergency situation).
32. See Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1381 (S.D. Fla.
2011) (“[T]he State’s interest in preventing discrimination is dubious, as the State itself
acknowledges that the law does not prevent a physician from terminating the doctor-patient
relationship if a patient refuses to answer questions regarding firearm ownership.”).
33. STATE OF FLA. HOUSE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMMITTEE, STAFF ANALYSIS, H.B. 2011155, at 5.
34. FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 2.
35. Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, Wollschlaeger v. Scott (No. 11-CV22026) 2011 WL 2177374.
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C. Challenge in the Southern District
The Honorable Marcia G. Cooke, granted plaintiffs motion for a
preliminary injunction in Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I) on
September 14, 201136 and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing
certain sections of FOPA in Wollschlaeger II on June 29, 2012.37 The
First Amendment analysis performed by Judge Cooke in Wollschlaeger I
and II contrasts greatly with that performed by the Eleventh Circuit in
Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida (Wollschlaeger III),38 which
completely evades the First Amendment altogether,39 and the court’s
second opinion after a rehearing in Wollschlaeger IV,40 which crafts an
entirely new model for analyzing restrictions on professional speech.41
In her analysis for the preliminary injunction in Wollschlaeger I,
Judge Cooke immediately set aside the State’s argument that the case
presents a Second Amendment issue stating, “[a] practitioner who
counsels a patient on firearm safety, even when entirely irrelevant to
medical care or safety, does not affect nor interfere with the patient’s right
to continue to own, possess, or use firearms.”42
Shifting her focus to the First Amendment, Judge Cooke proceeded to
look at FOPA’s legislative history and came to “the conclusion that the
law places restrictions on a particular subject matter” and thus falls into
the realm of a content-based speech restriction.43 As such, she reviewed
FOPA under a “strict scrutiny” standard.”44 The State argued that lesser
scrutiny should be applied because FOPA was a restriction on
professional speech.45 Typically, courts have applied less scrutiny to
professional speech.46 In deciding to grant plaintiffs preliminary
36. Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1367, 1371.
37. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger II), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1270 (S.D. Fla.
2012), rev’d sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), No. 12–14009, 2015
WL 453045 (11th Cir. July 28, 2015).
38. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014),
vacated and superseded on reh’g, Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045.
39. See id. at 1217.
40. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045.
41. Id. at *17–21.
42. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1374 (S.D. Fla.
2011).
43. Id. at 1378.
44. Id. at 1377.
45. Id. at 1379.
46. Id.; Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the First Amendment After
Sorrell, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 101, 103–04 (2012) (“Historically, courts gave no special
consideration to the fact that regulations affecting physician speech were content or speaker-based
since the courts never afforded special protection to content-based or speaker-based regulations
in the commercial context.”). But see id. (“However, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. IMS
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injunction, Judge Cooke elaborated on the applicability of strict scrutiny
in evaluating the constitutionality of FOPA based on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,47 and determined
that plaintiffs met all of the requirements for the preliminary injunction.48
In deciding whether to grant plaintiffs requested permanent injunction
in Wollschaleger II, Judge Cooke once again noted that FOPA “simply
does not interfere with the right to keep and bear arms” and, therefore,
she could not justify Second Amendment protection as a compelling
interest to justify the law.49
From a First Amendment perspective, Judge Cooke “note[ed] that
which constitutional standard should be applied in professional speech
cases is still an unsettled question of law.” 50 Yet, despite this uncertainty,
she decided that FOPA could not stand under strict scrutiny or rational
basis review.51 The State had a great deal of difficulty supporting even a
rational basis for the law, and Judge Cooke noted several times that the
State provided no supporting evidence that Florida physicians were
discriminating against gun owners or invading their privacy.52
In regard to gun owner discrimination, Judge Cooke recognized “that
the law does not prevent a physician from terminating a doctor-patient
relationship if a patient refuses to answer questions regarding firearm
ownership.”53 As a result, she determined that “[t]he antidiscrimination
provision therefore provides only remote, if any, support for the State’s
asserted purpose” of preventing gun owner discrimination.54
Judge Cooke reasoned that the State’s concern over the privacy of
patients’ medical information as it relates to gun ownership was
legitimate but not compelling due to the fact that there are already privacy
Health Incorporated, for the first time, suggested that a higher standard of scrutiny should be
applied to regulations of commercial speech that are content-based or speaker-targeted.”).
47. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1377–80.
48. Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1384.
49. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger II), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1264 (S.D. Fla.
2012), rev’d sub nom. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), No. 12–14009, 2015
WL 453045 (11th Cir. July 28, 2015).
50. Id. at 1262–63.
51. Id. (“I need not decide which standard applies because the State would not prevail under
either test.”).
52. Id. at 1256 (“It does not appear that the Florida legislature relied on any studies,
research, or statistics on physicians’ practices or patients’ experiences on this issue.”); id. at 1264
(“The State provides little more than anecdotal information, however, to support its contention
that individuals are suffering harassment and discrimination on the basis of firearm ownership.”);
id. at 1266 (“I recognize that the State may have, in the abstract, a legitimate interest in protecting
patients’ privacy regarding their firearm ownership or use. The State, however, fails to provide
any evidence that the confidentiality of this information is at risk.”).
53. Id. at 1264–65.
54. Id. at 1265.
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laws in place to protect this information.55 Judge Cooke also determined
that the State’s general interest in regulating the medical profession was
legitimate but not compelling enough to override the First Amendment
interests of the plaintiff physicians.56
With the State unable to “provide[ ] any evidence—beyond a handful
of anecdotes—to show that any real barriers actually exist” to gun owners
seeking medical attention,57 Judge Cooke found that FOPA could not
stand. She held that the State was permanently enjoined from enforcing
§§ 790.338(1), (2), (5), and (6), as well as any part of FOPA that would
provide for a punishment based on a violation of the unenforceable
provisions.58 Florida Governor Rick Scott and the Florida Department of
Health quickly appealed Judge Cooke’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.59
D. Both Eleventh Circuit Opinions
The Eleventh Circuit first heard oral arguments on this matter in July
of 201360 and ruled in Wollschlaeger III on July 24, 2014.61 But then,
after a rehearing, the court vacated Wollschlaeger III and released
Wollschaleger IV almost a year later on July 28, 2015.62 While
Wollschlaeger II at the district level determined that FOPA could not
survive any level of scrutiny,63 Wollschlaeger III characterized FOPA as
a permissible regulation of professional conduct that only incidentally
burdens speech.64 In the aftermath, Wollschlaeger IV addressed the First
Amendment more thoroughly by crafting a new model for analyzing
professional speech restrictions and found FOPA constitutional under
intermediate scrutiny.65 The disparity between Wollschlaeger II, III, and
IV suggests a strong need for the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the issue
of what standard should be applied to regulations that restrict professional
speech.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1266.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1270.
59. Zachary Fagenson, Appeals Court Hears Arguments in Florida’s “Docs v. Glocks”
Case, REUTERS (July 18, 2013, 7:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/18/us-usaflorida-guns-idUSBRE96H1J920130718.
60. Miller, supra note 1.
61. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), 760 F.3d 1195 (11th Cir. 2014),
vacated and superseded on reh’g, Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), No. 12–
14009, 2015 WL 453045 (11th Cir. July 28, 2015).
62. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045.
63. Wollschlaeger II, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
64. Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1217, 1225.
65. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045 at *17–21, *28.
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Wollschlaeger III practically ignored the First Amendment altogether
by characterizing FOPA as a permissible restriction on professional
conduct, not speech.66 Judge Gerald Tjoflat’s majority opinion
effectively created a bubble void of First Amendment rights for
physicians within the confines of an examination room; within this realm,
it seemed that all physician speech could be controlled as a regulation of
professional conduct.67 His reasoning seemed to create a slippery slope
that would allow for unlimited state control over conversations in any
regulated fiduciary relationship, undermining the foundational principles
of the First Amendment.68 As will be described below, the Wollschlaeger
IV opinion backpedals from the over breadth of Wollschlager III by
creating a more nuanced model to govern professional speech
restrictions.
Ironically, because FOPA prohibits irrelevant conversations,69 Judge
Charles Wilson’s dissent in Wollschlaeger III argued that it implicates the
conversations least worthy of state regulation or intrusion—these are the
conversations least likely to impact patient health.70 Irrelevant
conversations by their very nature do not involve actual medical
treatment or conduct. Perhaps noting this schism, Judge Tjoflat attempted
to correct for it with the model he created in Wollschlager IV, which
further justifies his conclusion based on the fiduciary relationship that
exists between doctors and their patients—regardless of the topic of
conversation.
After a rehearing, the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger IV once again
concluded that FOPA is not a violation of the First Amendment.71 But its
means of reaching that conclusion in Wollschlaeger IV barely resembles
its analysis in Wollschlaeger III. In Wollschlaeger IV, Judge Tjoflat
proposed a two-dimensional model of professional speech.72 This model
focuses on whether speech is by a professional in furtherance of the
profession and the relationship between the professional and the
listener.73 Using these two factors, Judge Tjoflat determined that
66. Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1217, 1225.
67. See id. at 1219–20.
68. Judge Charles Wilson’s dissent in Wollschlaeger III stated that he “[did] not . . . identify
a slippery slope” but rather the court’s “decision brings us to the bottom of that slope. All private
speech from professional to patients/clients is, after today, subject to regulation without
scrutiny”―the slope had already been slipped down. Id. at 1249 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
69. See FLA. STAT. § 790.388(2) (2014).
70. Wollschlaeger III, 760 F.3d at 1217, 1253–54 (Wilson, J., dissenting). He made the
same argument in Wollschlaeger IV. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045, at *43 (11th Cir. July
28, 2015) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
71. Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045, at *28.
72. Id. at *19–21.
73. Id. at *17–18.
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professional speech can fall into four categories: (1) speech related to the
profession that is addressed to the public; (2) speech related to the
profession that is addressed to a client in private; (3) private speech with
a client that is unrelated to the profession; and (4) public speech that is
unrelated to the profession.74
Using this paradigm, Judge Tjoflat concluded that a state’s interest in
regulating professional speech is “strongest when a professional speaks
in furtherance of his profession and weakest when a professional speaks
irrelative to his profession.”75 A state’s interest is also at its peak when
“speech occurs within the confines of a relationship of trust and
confidence,” such as the fiduciary relationship that exists between a
doctor and her patient.76 This concept may be best illustrated by the figure
below.
Speech Related to the
Profession

Speech Unrelated to
the Profession

Private/Fiduciary
Speech

State’s interest is
highest

Intermediate state
interest

Public Speech

Intermediate state
interest

State’s interest is
lowest

Type of Speech

In creating this model, Judge Tjoflat acknowledged that the Supreme
Court’s guidance in regard to professional speech restricitions has been
limited but that his model aligns with what little guidance the Court has
given.77 Because the Supreme Court has been silent on what level of
scrutiny should be applied to a law like FOPA, Judge Tjoflat used his
model and other supportive cases to infer that FOPA involves irrelevant
speech within a fiduciary relationship, thus warranting intermediate
scrutiny.78
Intermediate scrutiny requires the court to consider whether FOPA
“directly advances a substantial State interest, and is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.”79 Judge Tjfolat concluded that
74. Id. at *18.
75. Id. at *19.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *20–21.
78. Id. at *21–25.
79. Id. at *25 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Florida has a substantial interest in protecting gun owners from
discrimination and an invasion of privacy, and that these interests are
directly advanced by FOPA.80 Unlike Judge Cooke at the district level
who harped on the State’s lack of evidentiary support that such
discrimination or privacy concerns existed,81 Judge Tjoflat determined
that “peer-reviewed studies” and “extensive surveys” were unnecessary
to support the State’s “commonsense conclusion” that gun owners needed
the protections provided by FOPA.82 He further determined that FOPA
was narrowly tailored and not more extensive than needed to serve the
State’s interest.83 In conclusion, despite the fact that Judge Cooke
determined that FOPA could not stand even under rational basis review—
the lowest level of scrutiny—Judge Tjoflat determined that the law could
withstand intermediate scrutiny and was not a violation of the First
Amendment.84
E. Expansion of Similar Legislation
Now that FOPA has received a constitutional stamp of approval from
the Eleventh Circuit, such legislation may be more likely to develop in
other states. The National Rifle Association (NRA) began lobbying for
state legislatures to pass laws similar to FOPA in 2006, but it had been
unsuccessful until Florida passed FOPA in 2011.85 Montana adopted
similar legislation in 2013,86 and other states may be inclined to do the
same in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s recent Wollschlaeger IV ruling.
With support from the NRA, legislation similar to FOPA was
introduced in the legislatures of Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, North
Carolina, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and South Carolina.87 In 2006,
legislation similar to Florida’s was introduced in Virginia and West
Virginia but failed to become law in those states.88 A similar bill was
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at *25–26.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
Wollschlaeger IV, 2015 WL 453045, at *27.
Id. at *28.
Id.
See Foody, supra note 15, at 255.
See, e.g., Montana and Florida Curtail Doctor’s Speech, LAW CENTER TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE (Aug. 27, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/montana-and-florida-curtail-doctors-speech/
(explaining Montana’s adoption of a weaker version of FOPA); see also Lindsey Gordon, Gun
Owners Get More Privacy When Seeking Healthcare Thanks to New Law, KXLF.COM (Oct. 1,
2013, 11:46 PM), http://www.kxlf.com/news/gun-owners-get-more-privacy-when-seekinghealthcare-thanks-to-new-law/ (detailing Montana’s adoption of a new law prohibiting doctors
from conditioning treatment on a patient’s cooperation in answering questions about gun
ownership).
87. See Foody, supra note 15, at 255–56.
88. Id. at 255.
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introduced again in West Virginia in 2011 but did not make it out of the
house.89 In 2011, similar bills in Alabama, North Carolina, and Minnesota
also failed.90 In response to an announcement by President Barrack
Obama in January 2013 “that the Affordable Care Act does not prohibit
doctors from asking their patients about guns in their homes,” legislation
that would ban physician inquiries about firearms was introduced in
Oklahoma and South Carolina.91
Perhaps noting the litigation involving FOPA, Montana worded its
similar law in a manner intended to avoid implicating the First
Amendment.92 The Montana law focuses more on preventing doctors
from discriminating against gun owners than restricting physician speech
about guns. The Montana law reads:
(1) No health care provider or health care facility may:
(a) refuse to provide health care to a person because the
person declines to answer any questions concerning the
person’s ownership, possession, or use of firearms; or
(b) inquire about a person’s ownership, possession, or use of
firearms as a condition of receiving healthcare.93
Thus, under the Montana law, physicians can ask patients whether
they own a gun—there is no restriction on physician speech—but they
cannot terminate their relationships with patients based on their answers
or decision not to disclose. The Montana law essentially replaces
Florida’s controversial limit on professional speech with a limit on a
physician’s discretion to terminate a patient relationship based on the
patient’s failure to answer firearms related questions. The Montana law,
however, may have the same negligible impact as FOPA because doctors
can generally terminate a patient relationship without cause and it may be
difficult for a patient to prove a doctors discriminatory intent.94
Recognizing the growing trend of this type of legislation, the
American Bar Association (ABA) passed a resolution opposing laws like
89. Id.
90. Id. at 255–56.
91. Id. at 256 (internal quotation marks omitted).
92. See H.B. 459, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mont. 2013); see also Gordon, supra note 86.
93. MONT. CODE. ANN. 50-16-108 (2013).
94. See Laura A. Dixon, Terminating Patient Relationships, DOCTORS CO.,
http://www.thedoctors.com/knowledgecenter/patientsafety/articles/CON_ID_000326 (last visited July
1, 2015) (documenting that the nation’s largest physician-owned medical malpractice insurer
maintains “[i]t is an acceptable practice to end a patient relationship under most conditions”); FLA.
STAT. § 790.388(4) (2014) (“A patient’s decision not to answer a question relating to the presence
or ownership of a firearm does not alter existing law regarding a physician’s authorization to
choose his or her patients.”).
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FOPA:
[T]he American Bar Association opposes governmental
actions and policies that limit the rights of physicians . . . to
inquire of their patients whether they possess guns and how
they are secured in the home or to counsel their patients
about the dangers of guns in the home and safe practices to
avoid those dangers.95
Judge Wilson’s Wollschlaeger IV dissent explicitly recognized the
ABA’s stance on this issue.96
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Wollschlaeger IV may influence
other states to adopt legislation similar to FOPA under the assumption
that such restrictions can pass constitutional muster. With this in mind,
the next two Parts will consider the impact and effectiveness of FOPA
from a discrimination and privacy perspective.
II. SO . . . WHEN CAN DOCTORS ACTUALLY DISCRIMINATE?
The oddity of FOPA is that it succeeded at chilling the speech of
physicians, but never really achieved Florida’s goal of preventing doctors
from discriminating against gun owners.97 This certainly begs the
question: Can doctors discriminate against gun owners? This Part will
argue that the answer to this question is yes, doctors can most likely get
away with discriminating against gun owners. This answer depends
somewhat on whether the doctor is a state actor—whose discriminatory
conduct may be challenged as a violation of Equal Protection—or a
private doctor subject to state legislation similar to FOPA and other
federal laws. Either way, plaintiffs will face an uphill battle in proving a
physician’s discriminatory intent, especially given the general discretion
in patient selection that the physicians maintain. While the State failed to
provide any significant evidence of discrimination against gun owners in
Wollschlaeger II,98 in the event that such conduct occurs or becomes a
growing trend, there is little to protect gun owners from such prejudice.

95. AM. BAR ASS’N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 111, at 1 (2011), available at
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house_of_delegates/resolutions/2012_hod_
annual_meeting_111.authcheckdam.doc.
96. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger IV), No. 12–14009, 2015 WL
453045, at *30 n.2 (11th Cir. July 28, 2015) (Wilson, J., dissenting).
97. Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger II), 880 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1264–65, 1266–67
(S.D. Fla. 2012), rev’d sub nom. (Wollschlaeger IV), 2015 WL 453045 (11th Cir. July 28, 2015).
98. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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A. State Actors
This Section looks at how gun owner discrimination may play out
among state-actor physicians, such as doctors working at a Veteran’s
Affairs Hospital or a state university clinic. If patients were to claim gun
owner discrimination against these state actors, their claim would likely
rest on an Equal Protection argument.99 Gun ownership, as a factor that a
doctor may account for in determining whether to treat a patient, is unique
in the sense that gun ownership is an affirmative choice protected as a
fundamental right under Substantive Due Process, but there is no
corollary protection from discrimination for exercising that right under
Equal Protection.100 Gun owners are unlikely to be considered a suspect
class in an Equal Protection analysis, therefore, discrimination against a
gun owner would only need to have a rational basis.101
Gun ownership as a fundamental right under Substantive Due Process
was only recently established in District of Columbia v. Heller102 and
McDonald v. City of Chicago.103 Thus the Court has not had much time
(or perhaps the opportunity)104 to grant certiorari on an appropriate case
to consider whether gun owners facing discrimination based on state
action deserve to be protected with strict scrutiny under Equal Protection.
As guns become an increasingly polarizing issue, gun owners may start
to develop claims against state actors for discrimination.
When state action impacts a suspect class under Equal Protection, the
Court applies strict scrutiny, which means that the government must
justify the action based on a compelling state purpose.105 Because gun
owners are unlikely to be characterized as a suspect class,106 any state
99. They could likely also rely on any laws discussed in Section II.B, but Equal Protection
would not allow patients to challenge the discriminatory conduct of the private doctors described
in that Section. Part II maintains this important distinction by discussing these issues separately.
100. See ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 943, 945
(4th ed. 2011).
101. The Court’s default test for a suspect class asks whether the discriminated-against group
of people represents a “discrete and insular minority.” United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 303
U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
102. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
103. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); see also CHEMERINKSY, supra note 100, at 941–45.
104. The Court has probably not addressed discrimination against gun owners because it is
not yet a pervasive issue in American society.
105. CHEMERINKSY, supra note 100, at 686–87.
106. The Supreme Court typically considers three factors in determining if a class of people
is suspect: (1) whether the group has suffered a history of intentional discrimination; (2) whether
the group is being discriminated against based on an immutable characteristic that cannot be
controlled, such as race; and (3) whether the group subject to discrimination lacks political power.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 688; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432, 440–41, 445 (1985); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976); Ann M. Reding, Note, Lofton v. Kearney: Equal Protection Mandates Equal Adoption
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action that has a discriminatory effect on gun owners would be analyzed
under a rational basis review. The rational basis test places a lower burden
on states. States must prove only that a regulation is rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose.107 Even at this lower level of scrutiny,
it seems that it would be nearly impossible for a state physician to have
an actual rational basis for discriminating against a gun owner.108 Thus,
if a state-actor doctor were to refuse to treat a patient because the doctor
learned that the patient owned a gun, it seems that the state would have a
hard time justifying the doctor’s discrimination as rational.
But this may not be detrimental to the state because a patient-plaintiff
would also have a hard time proving that a doctor actually terminated a
patient relationship because the patient was a gun owner—a doctor can
generally decline to treat a patient without cause, except in emergency
situations.109 It remains unclear whether a court would consider a state
doctor to have a rational basis under Equal Protection for terminating a
relationship with a patient who declined to answer questions about gun
ownership, thus hurting the vital trust needed between doctors and their
patients—the rationale given by Dr. Okonkwo in Ocala.110
Thus, it seems that physicians working for a state or for the federal
government may most likely discriminate against gun owners as long as
they avoid explicitly refusing to treat patients because they own a gun.
This requirement of proof of intent has created difficulties for suspect
classes attempting to bring claims for health care discrimination as

Rights, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1301 (2003). Given that Florida failed to provide evidence
of gun owner discrimination in Wollschlaeger II, it seems unlikely that gun owners could establish
a history of such discrimination. Gun owners would also have a struggle arguing that their choice
to own firearms—although protected by the Constitution—is in any way an immutable
characteristic. Lastly, powerful lobbying organizations likely the NRA would certainly make it
difficult for gun owners to argue that they lack political power.
107. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 100, at 686, 688.
108. It is important to point out that a physician’s right to refuse to give treatment based on
a moral objection is a highly contested and controversial area of the law. See generally Jill
Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered Care and Limitations on the
Right to Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 141 (2010)
(arguing that “it is ethically improper for medical practitioners to use their position of influence
that results from superior scientific knowledge to impose their moral preferences on a patient”);
Rachel Reibman, Comment, The Patient Wanted the Doctor to Treat Her in the Closet, but the
Janitor Wouldn’t Open the Door: Healthcare Provider Rights of Refusal Versus LGB Rights to
Reproductive and Elder Healthcare, 28 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 65 (2009). This author
is unaware of any doctors refusing to treat gun-owning patients based on a moral objection, but
this is certainly a possibility given the increasingly controversial nature of gun ownership.
109. See supra note 31.
110. See supra Section I.A. This is the specific type of patient termination the Montana
Legislature is trying to avoid with Montana Statute 50-16-108 (2013).
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well.111 If a suspect class can barely overcome the hurdle of proving a
physician’s intent, it seems even less likely that gun owners, a nonsuspect class, would be able to overcome that same challenge.
B. Private Actors
This Section contemplates discrimination against gun owners by
private physicians, such as those in a family medical practice, who
receive federal funding in the form of Medicare or Medicaid payments,
and by physicians who receive no federal funding whatsoever, such as a
plastic surgeon whose work is not subsidized by the government. Gun
owners seeking protection from discrimination must rely on state laws
like Florida Statute § 790.388(5) to protect their interests because there
is no federal law to prevent private or state doctors from discriminating
against gun owners. Even if such a federal law existed, similar laws to
protect suspect classes have failed to truly eliminate disparate medical
treatment for those groups, making it unlikely that a law to protect gun
owners would have any real impact.112 The U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights, a bipartisan agency created by Congress, has found that “unequal
access to health care is a nationwide problem that primarily affects
women and people of color.”113
Section 601 of Title VI states that “[n]o person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”114 This law prevents private entities that receive federal
111. See Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 195, 287–91 (2003) (discussing the Supreme Court’s requirement for proof of intentional
discrimination when minority groups receive disparate medical treatment and the heavy burden
this creates for harmed plaintiffs because a lot of discrimination in the medical field results from
subconscious biases); see, e.g., id. 195–96 (listing examples of disparate medical treatment for
different groups of people); Barbara A. Noah, Racist Health Care?, 48 FLA. L. REV. 357, 358–63
(1996) (discussing data from a study finding “a tendency of health care providers to pursue less
aggressive therapies for African-American patients who did seek medical care”); see also
Vernellia R. Randall, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in Health Care: A Call for State Health
Care Anti-Discrimination Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 5–9 (2006) (discussing the
institutional racism of the U.S. health care system and the federal government’s failure to provide
a true remedy for groups subjected to discrimination). See generally MICHAEL BYRD & LINDA A.
CLAYTON, AN AMERICAN HEALTH DILEMMA: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS AND
THE PROBLEM OF RACE, BEGINNINGS TO 1900 (Routledge, 2000) (offering a lengthy discussion of
the scientific racism that permitted racial disparities in health care).
112. See Randall, supra note 111, at 8–9.
113. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE HEALTH CARE CHALLENGE: ACKNOWLEDGING
DISPARITY, CONFRONTING DISCRIMINATION, AND ENSURING EQUITY, at i, vii (Sept. 1999),
available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/usccr/documents/cr12h34z.pdf.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (emphasis added).
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funding, such as Medicare or Medicaid payments, from discriminating
against individuals based on inherent characteristics, such as race. But
Title VI makes no mention of preventing discrimination against gun
owners.
Even if gun owners were added into Title VI, it is very difficult for
the current groups protected under Title VI to recover damages because
the Court requires proof of intentional discrimination—data supporting
an aggregate effect of disparate medical treatment is insufficient.115 It is
often challenging for patients to prove that a doctor intentionally
discriminated against them because of their race despite significant
evidence to support the idea that doctors treat patients differently because
of their race.116
In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission,117 the Court
addressed the issue of “whether the private plaintiffs . . . need[ed] to prove
discriminatory intent to establish a violation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.”118 The Court determined that “compensatory relief
should not be awarded to private Title VI plaintiffs; unless discriminatory
intent is shown, declaratory and limited injunctive relief should be the
only available private remedies for Title VI violations.”119 The Court
reasoned that “Title VI does not of its own force proscribe unintentional
racial discrimination”120 The Court determined that victims of intentional
discrimination at the hands of an entity receiving federal funding should
certainly be awarded just compensation.121 The Court concluded by
stating, “discriminatory intent is not an essential element of a Title VI
violation, but that a private plaintiff should recover only injunctive,
noncompensatory relief for a defendant’s unintentional violations of Title
VI.”122

115. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. If gun owners were considered a “class”
worthy of Title VI protection, they may be able to seek injunctive relief against discriminating
physicians without being required to show discriminatory intent. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 (1983). The real challenge would be proving intentional
discrimination in order to receive money damages.
116. See Crossley, supra note 111, at 211–17, 223–29 (detailing how doctors treat medical
conditions differently based on the race and gender of the patient). Discrimination in Title VI
situations typically involves a lack of access to equal quality healthcare; whereas the
discrimination gun owners would likely face is an outright denial of treatment or access to
healthcare services.
117. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
118. Id. at 584.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 590.
121. Id. at 597–98.
122. Id. at 607.
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This holding was further supported in the later case of Alexander v.
Sandoval,123 which addressed “whether private individuals may sue to
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under [§ 602 of] Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.”124 Alexander recognized that the
Court’s previous opinions may have left uncertainty in the interpretation
of Title VI and thus set out to clarify the law.125 The Court stated that
“private individuals may sue to enforce § 601 of Title VI and obtain both
injunctive relief and damages” and that “it is . . . beyond dispute—and no
party disagrees—that § 601 [of Title VI] prohibits only intentional
discrimination.”126 The main clarification Alexander provides is that
while § 602 of Title VI allows for regulations that prohibit activities with
a disparate impact on racial groups, these regulations do not carry over
into a private right of action under § 601.127 Thus, while § 602 allows for
the creation of disparate-impact regulations, it does not create a private
right of action to enforce them under § 601.128 The Court in Alexander
concluded by stating that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as later
amended does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private
right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602.”129
With the holdings from Guardians and Alexander in mind, it is
difficult to see how the groups currently protected under Title VI could
prove intentional discrimination and recover damages. The challenge
would be equally great if gun owners were ever extended Title VI
protection. Such discrimination is often difficult to detect and even more
difficult to prove beyond aggregate effects.
Given that no such Title VI protection currently exists for gun owners,
private doctors receiving federal funding can almost certainly
discriminate against gun-owning patients—even if the patient could
prove discriminatory intent. It follows that there would be nothing to
prevent private physicians who do not receive any federal funding from
discriminating against gun owners as well.
In considering these issues, it is critical to remember that there is no
significant evidence to support the idea that gun owners are actually being
denied medical treatment because of their choice to own firearms.130
While it may be unjust or irrational for doctors to refuse to treat patients
because they are exercising their Second Amendment right to bear arms,
such refusals seem to be limited and generally unsupported by fact. At
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

532 U.S. 275 (2001).
Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 281–82, 293.
Id. at 286, 289, 291.
Id. at 293.
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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most, such incidents are rare and have no proven negative impact on
individual gun owners in need of medical attention. At the moment, it
seems that there is very little to prevent a doctor from discriminating
against a gun owner, but this is balanced out by the fact that no such
discrimination is generally occurring.
III. PRIVACY: ARE DOCTORS REPORTING GUN OWNERSHIP
INFORMATION TO THE GOVERNMENT?
During oral argument for Wollschlaeger III Judge Tjoflat expressed
concerns about whether physicians would provide the federal
government with information about patients who own guns.131 Judge
Tjoflat expressed his concerns over the creation of a national gun registry
by stating, “It goes to Uncle Sam in Washington. You understand my
concern . . . . You can put it in a computer and spit out everybody who
owns a gun.”132 Jason Brodeur, the Florida Representative who proposed
FOPA, was also “concerned about doctors asking patients about guns in
the home and then allowing that information to get into the hands of the
government,” particularly in light of the passage of a national healthcare
system under the Affordable Care Act.133 Appellees responded to these
concerns by stating that they were unaware of any state or federal
provision that required physicians to provide the federal government with
lists of gun owners and that medical records are protected by strict
privacy laws.134
Even with these strict privacy laws already in place, Florida passed
FOPA to alleviate concerns over the privacy of patient’s gun ownership
information in the hands of physicians.135 The plaintiff doctors seemed to
highly value this information as part of practicing preventative medicine
and as serving some sort of public good.136 Both sides, however, may be

131. Jay Weaver, No Decision in Round Two of ‘Docs v. Glocks’ in Miami Federal Appeals
Court, MIAMI HERALD (July 18, 2013), http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/18/3505391/itsround-two-of-docs-vs-glocks.html.
132. Curt Anderson, Court Hears State Appeal Seeking to Reinstate Gun Discussion Law in
‘Docks v. Glocks’ Case, STAR TRIBUNE (July 18, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://www.startribune.com/politics/nation
al/216006601.html (internal quotation marks omitted). It is currently illegal for the federal government to
maintain a digital, national gun registry. Melissa Block, The Low-Tech Way Guns Get Traced, NPR (May
20, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/05/20/185530763/the-low-tech-way-guns-get-traced
(discussing the federal ban on the creation of a digital, electronic gun registry and explaining the
not-so-tech-savvy process the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms uses to trace a gun).
133. Sharockman, supra note 4.
134. Anderson, supra note 132.
135. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
136. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 2. As noted above, advising patients on
firearms safety seems to be a proactive step towards realizing the goals of Florida Statute
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exaggerating the situation into a far bigger problem or necessity than it
actually is.
As for the state’s privacy concerns, both Florida and federal privacy
laws protect a patient’s medical records with certain limited exceptions.
There is currently no exception that specifically allows a doctor to release
information pertaining to a patient’s gun ownership. Under Florida
Statute § 456.057(7) medical “records may not be furnished to, and the
medical condition of a patient may not be discussed with, any person
other than the patient . . . except upon written authorization from the
patient.”137 In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which also protects patient information.138
Pursuant to HIPAA, the Department of Health and Human Services
promulgated the Privacy Rule, which states that “[a] covered entity or
business associate may not use or disclose protected health
information.”139
There are limited exceptions to these confidentiality laws, but
certainly nothing that would allow the federal government to compile this
information in order to create a digital gun registry as suggested by Judge
Tjoflat during oral argument.140 One exception to patient-psychiatrist
confidentiality in Florida is found in Florida Statute § 456.059. Under this
provision, a psychiatrist may “disclose patient communications to the
extent necessary to warn any potential victim or to communicate the
threat to a law enforcement agency” after a “patient has made an actual
threat to physically harm an identifiable victim” and the psychiatrist has
made a clinical judgment that the patient is capable of committing the

§ 790.173(1) (2014) (noting that “a tragically large number of Florida children have been
accidentally killed or seriously injured by negligently stored firearms”).
137. FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a) (2014).
138. HIPAA and Disclosures Under Florida State Law, UNIV. OF FLA.: HEALTH INFO.
PRIVACY, http://privacy.health.ufl.edu/faq/hipaa_disclosures.shtml (last visited July 1, 2015) (The
HIPAA “Privacy Rule prohibits health care providers from using or disclosing a patient’s
protected health information (PHI) without written authorization from the patient except for
treatment, payment and health care operations”); id. (“The Privacy Rule provides an extensive list
of permitted disclosures, however, where state laws provide greater privacy protections or privacy
rights with respect to patients’ PHI, state laws will apply, overriding HIPAA.”); id. (“The Privacy
Rule provides exceptions . . . . includ[ing] but . . . not limited to, reporting certain injuries to law
enforcement officials, reporting child abuse or vulnerable adult abuse, reporting the occurrence
of certain diseases to public health officials, and complying with court orders and subpoenas.”).
139. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2014); see also Your Health Information Privacy Rights, U.S. DEPT. FOR
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 1, 1, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hi
paa/understanding/consumers/consumer_rights.pdf (last visited July 1, 2015) (“Generally, your health
information cannot be used for purposes not directly related to your care without your permission.”).
140. See supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
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threatened action.141 In such a situation, depending on the nature of the
patient’s threat, it may be necessary for a physician to release details
regarding the patient’s gun ownership to law enforcement. However, the
release of such information does not allow the state to prevent a patient
from purchasing a firearm until the patient has been adjudged mentally
incompetent or has been committed under the Baker Act142—thus, said
patient’s right to bear arms may remain intact despite the physician’s
report to law enforcement.
Florida Statute § 790.25 prohibits mentally incompetent individuals
from carrying a firearm and Florida has other regulations that prevent a
person adjudged mentally incompetent from purchasing a firearm.143
141. FLA. STAT.§ 456.059(2)–(3) (2014); This Florida law resembles a California Supreme
Court ruling that provides the following:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to
another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended
victim against such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist
to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case. Thus
it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise the
victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976). But Florida has generally
interpreted a physician’s duty to warn more narrowly than the California Supreme Court. E.g.,
Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So. 2d 446, 447–48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (declining to extend
California’s Tarasoff duty to Florida); id. at 450 (“To impose a duty to warn or protect third parties
would require the psychiatrist to foresee a harm which may or may not be foreseeable, depending
on the clarity of his crystal ball. Because of the inherent difficulties psychiatrists face in predicting
a patient’s dangerousness, psychiatrists cannot be charged with accurately making those
predictions and with sharing those predictions with others. Therefore, we decline to charge Dr.
Burglass with such a duty.”). See generally Ben “Ziggy” Williamson, Note, The Gunslinger to
the Ivory Tower Came: Should Universities Have a Duty to Prevent Rampage Killings?, 60 FLA.
L. REV. 895, 898 (2008) (exploring whether universities have a duty to “identify and thwart”
potential student-shooters).
142. FLA. STAT. § 790.25(2)(b). The Florida Mental Health Act, FLA. STAT. § 394.451–
47891, commonly known as the Baker Act, is a Florida law that allows for mentally unstable
individuals to be admitted for mental health examinations on a voluntary or involuntary basis with
attorney representation. History of the Baker Act – It’s Development and Intent, FLA. DEP’T CHILD.
& FAMS. 1 (May 2002), http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/MentalHealth/laws/histba.pdf;
see also Possession of Firearms by People with Mental Illness, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/possessionof-a-firearm-by-the-mentally-ill.aspx (listing each state’s rules regarding whether mentally
incompetent individuals can own firearms).
143. Before an individual can purchase a firearm in Florida, the state conducts a background
check pursuant to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement’s (FDLE) Firearm Purchase
Program to check for, among other things, previous adjudications of mental defectiveness or
commitments to mental institutions. FLA. STAT. § 790.065(2)(a)(4) (2014); Firearm Purchase
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That being said, a doctor of a mentally incompetent patient cannot release
or use information about that patient’s status as a gun owner unless there
is an actual threat and an identifiable victim as described in Florida
Statute § 456.059, or there is a court ordered subpoena.144
While the value of recorded patient gun ownership information for
physicians may be questionable given the limited circumstances when it
may be utilized, the threat posed by the collection of this information is
equally dubious. It is hard to see a substantial reason to trust laws like
HIPAA to protect medical records, but not trust these laws to protect gun
ownership information stored in exactly the same manner and with the
same protections.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult to ascertain how many lives are saved or injuries are
prevented when a doctor gives a patient advice on how to properly store
a firearm. It is equally difficult to determine if any public good is served
by doctors maintaining records of patients who own guns given the
extremely narrow set of circumstances when this information can be
revealed. There is also not enough evidence to support the idea that gun
owners are facing discrimination that impacts their ability to seek medical
care.

Program, FLA. DEP’T LAW ENFORCEMENT, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/a6ab812a94c0-46fd-914b-aae73a15109b/Home.aspx (last visited July 1, 2015). If an individual has been
“[a]djudicated mentally defective by a court of law, or involuntarily committed by a judge,” then
the FDLE will not clear that person to purchase a firearm. Potential Reasons for Conditional NonApproval, Non-Approval, Pending Non-Approval and Conditional Approval, FLA. DEP’T LAW
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/c088443b-8d75-43d1-a8ed-2b1b9611
bd9e/FAQs3.aspx (last visited July 1, 2015). The FDLE’s Firearm Purchase Program serves the
same purpose as FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) but on a state
DEP’T
LAW
ENFORCEMENT,
level.
Firearm
Purchase
Program,
FLA.
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/getdoc/64e4b93a-fde0-4fd8-abe3-1540ae464c99/FAQs1.aspx (last
visited July 1, 2015). Unfortunately, states often do a poor job of turning over vital background
check information, such as the fact that an individual has been adjudged mentally incompetent, to
the NICS system, which many states rely on exclusively for gun purchase background checks.
This flaw in the system may allow a mentally incompetent individual who cannot purchase a gun
in Florida to purchase a gun in another state or to seek a federal gun license. See Fatal Gaps: Can
Dangerous People Buy Guns in Your State?, MAYORS AGAINST ILLEGAL GUNS 2, 16, 19 (Nov.
2011), http://everytown.org/article/closing-the-gaps/; Florida Mental Illness Gun Control Bill Passes,
HUFFINGTON POST MIAMI (Apr. 30, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/floridaguns-mentally-ill_n_3187474.html (discussing failures to report mental health records to the NICS).While
there is certainly an issue with mentally incompetent individuals being able to purchase guns due
to flaws in the background check system, doctors’ collection of patient gun ownership information
does not seem to resolve this problem.
144. See FLA. STAT. § 456.057(7)(a)(3) (2014); supra text accompanying note 138.
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Given that the benefits of FOPA seem negligible, it is more a matter
of pride than purpose, and that the court’s approval of the law rests on
shaky, untested First Amendment grounds, it seems that Florida’s
resources and time could be better spent on other gun related matters. The
state’s efforts might be better spent improving reporting of mental
incompetency to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE)
and National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).145
Mental health and guns are becoming increasingly intertwined,146 and
rather than pitting physicians against gun owners, Florida’s legislators
should instead focus their efforts on promoting public safety in this realm.
Fortunately, Florida is making some progress toward limiting
mentally ill individuals’ access to firearms. Until recently, Florida law
only prevented an individual who had been involuntarily “Baker Acted”
from purchasing a firearm.147 On June 28, 2013, Governor Rick Scott
signed House Bill 1355 into law.148 This new law eliminates a gap that
allowed individuals who were voluntarily committed under the Baker Act
to continue to purchase firearms.149 Now, if Floridians want to purchase
a firearm after being committed under the Baker Act, they must seek
approval from both a judge and a physician in order to have their name
removed from the FDLE’s list of individuals suffering from mental
illness.150 The NRA supported this Florida legislation, and a
spokesperson for the group said, “Everyone should support” a “bill [that]
will prevent dangerous people with mental illness from being able to buy
guns.”151
At the same time, while this law will prevent individuals committed
under the Baker Act from purchasing new firearms, it does not remove
firearms the individual already possesses.152 In these scenarios, it does
not seem like a doctor’s knowledge that a patient owns a firearm has
145. See supra note 143.
146. See supra note 16.
147. Florida Mental Illness Gun Control Bill Passes, supra note 143. Only 1% of all patients
committed under the Baker Act are involuntarily committed. Id. Under the previous state of the
law, most individuals could continue to purchase firearms after voluntarily committing
themselves. Under this new law, all patients committed under the Baker Act will have their names
added to the FDLE’s mental competency database and the NICS. Id.
148. Rochelle Koff, Gov. Scott Signs Bill to Ban Gun Sales to Mentally Ill, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (June 28, 2013, 6:54 PM) http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/the-buzz-florida-politics/govscott-signs-bill-to-ban-gun-sales-to-mentally-ill/2129141; see FLA. STAT. § 790.065(b)(ii) (2014).
149. Koff, supra note 148.
150. Id.
151. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“91 percent of NRA members said they support
laws to keep guns out of the hands of people with mental illnesses.”).
152. Firearm Prohibition for Certain Individuals with Mental Illness, FLA. DEP’T CHILD. &
FAMS. 2–3 (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/MentalHealth/laws/HB1355Saleanddeliveryoffirearms.pdf.
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much value if patients are allowed to continue to own firearms after being
committed under the Baker Act—the only limit seems to be that such
patients cannot purchase new firearms without court approval. Perhaps
this is the next area in need of legislation.153 If a mentally ill individual
cannot purchase new firearms because it is a threat to public safety, then
any firearms already in that individual’s possesion should be considered
equally threatening to the public.
With these small improvements in mind, it is time to move forward.
From a public policy standpoint, FOPA’s enforcement or enjoinment has
few benefits or repercussions, and the act is a prime example of
reactionary, jump-the-gun (pun intended) legislation based on twisted
facts and insufficient research. Nothing can be resolved if both sides
continue to waste resources on issues like FOPA where neither side can
really win when they “win.” Restricting physician speech is not the
answer, nor is allowing such speech the real solution; the path to reducing
gun violence and increasing gun safety can only be found when everyone
metaphorically “puts their guns down” and starts having a real
conversation about these issues.

153. It is certainly a big step to suggest that the government confiscate any form of property,
let alone firearms. But there must be a middle ground here where an individual’s ability to
purchase and possess firearms can be limited on a case-by-case basis given that individual’s
mental condition, criminal history, and likelihood of suffering from the same episode that created
a need for detention under the Baker Act in the first place.
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